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INTRODUCTION
On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a
memorandum (the "Ogden Memorandum"), that gave U.S. Attorneys "guid-
ance and clarification" on how to enforce the Controlled Substances Act in
states where medical marijuana had been legalized."' The path-breaking memo-
randum said that with the Department of Justice's desire to "mak[e] efficient
and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources," prose-
cutors were to "not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana."2 The memorandum directed pros-
ecutors to shift resources towards other, higher-priority prosecutions.3 While
the memorandum did not make medical marijuana legal under federal law, it
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1. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Attorneys I
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united
-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states.
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. (The memorandum asked prosecutors to target possession of marijuana when
tied to "unlawful possession or unlawful use of firearms; violence; sales to minor;
financial and marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or pur-
poses of state law, including evidence of money laundering activity and/or finan-
cial gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent with purported compliance
with state or local law; amounts of marijuana inconsistent with purported com-
pliance with state or local law; illegal possession or sale of other controlled sub-
stances; or ties to other criminal enterprises.").
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opened up a conversation about the degree to which the Obama administration
would refrain from prosecuting cases involving medical marijuana. 4
Concerned that some might seek to use the memorandum as the basis for a
legal defense, the memorandum included a strong disclaimer stating that it was
not intended to create any legal rights. The Ogden Memorandum stated explic-
itly that the Department of Justice's decision to prioritize the prosecution of
some crimes over others could not be invoked as a legal defense in any particu-
lar case. The memorandum made clear that it did not "provide a legal defense
to a violation of federal law" and was "intended solely as a guide to the exercise
of investigative and prosecutorial discretion."5 If an individual believes that the
Ogden Memorandum protects her from prosecution, this belief would be a
"mistake of law" and is not a legal defense.6
While the memorandum was not intended to impact the behavior of states,
cities or individuals, there was huge growth in the medical marijuana industry
after it was issued. Following the memorandum's release, "the number of medi-
cal marijuana patients and dispensaries in the states that have enacted legisla-
tion legalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana for the treat-
ment of certain illnesses" increased dramatically. 7 This growth was "directly
attributable to the imprimatur of the Executive Branch with respect to medical
marijuana."8 The medical marijuana industry believed that the government
would not prosecute users and distributors in states where it was legal.9 Some
4. This Comment refers to the Ogden Memorandum as the title of the policy estab-
lished by the Obama administration's Department of Justice to encourage selec-
tive utilization of prosecutorial resources to prosecute marijuana offenses. That
policy originally established in 2009 has been reinforced in later memoranda,
most recently in a memorandum sent to the U.S. Attorneys in August 2013 by Da-
vid Ogden's successor, James Cole (the "Cole Memorandum"). See Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys i (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3o5213829132756857467.pdf. For defini-
tional consistency, this Comment refers to the "Ogden Memorandum" or "Ogden
policy" though the position is continued in further memoranda.
5. Ogden Memorandum, supra note i, at 2.
6. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (explaining that "[t]he general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution
is deeply rooted in the American legal system").
7. Vijay Sekhon, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the Executive Branch's Deci-
sion To Not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in Compliance with State Medical
Marijuana Laws, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 553, 559-56o (2010).
8. Id. at 560.
9. Ryan Grim & Ryan J. Reilly, Obama's Drug War: After Medical Marijuana Mess,
Feds Face Big Decision on Pot, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2013), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2o13/01/26/obamas-drug-war-medical-marijuana n-
2546178.html (quoting Steph Sherer, the head of Americans for Safe Access, who
noted that the medical marijuana industry interpreted the Ogden Memorandum
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states, including Washington and Montana, began to legalize medical marijua-
na in the belief that the Ogden Memorandum would protect medical marijuana
users in their states from federal prosecution.'"
Some local governments explicitly relied on the Ogden Memorandum in
constructing their policies. For example, the State of Delaware and the City of
Oakland both relied on the Ogden Memorandum when deciding to grant per-
mits to marijuana dispensaries within their jurisdictions. The Solicitor General
of Delaware stated that Delaware licensed medical marijuana dispensaries be-
cause of "guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice that federal prosecution
resources" would not be steered towards prosecuting the medical marijuana in-
dustry." Similarly, the City of Oakland claimed in litigation that, "[i]n reliance
on the government's statements and conduct [in the Ogden Memorandum],
Oakland permitted and regulated the growth of the medical cannabis industry
within Oakland.""2 Oakland claimed that it had invested "substantial resources
to administering the medical cannabis dispensary permit program" because of
the Ogden Memorandum. 3
While disavowing that the memorandum had any legal significance, the
White House was aware that broad swaths of the public were relying on the
memorandum to consume and sell medical marijuana. A former White House
official who worked on drug policy conceded, "Nobody can argue that the
number of medical marijuana shops in California and Colorado didn't grow at
an exponential rate directly because of [the Ogden Memorandumj."14 The Og-
den Memorandum, even if it was not intended to, created a widespread percep-
tion that the federal government would no longer prosecute individuals for pos-
session or distribution of marijuana in a state where medical marijuana had
been legalized.
This raises an important question: in the event that DOJ chooses to prose-
cute an individual for utilizing or distributing medical marijuana, should the
defendant be able to invoke the Ogden Memorandum as a defense? Under the
entrapment by estoppel defense, a defendant can argue that the government's
assurance of the legality of an otherwise unlawful activity provides a total de-
fense. Would such a defense be valid if an individual relied on the Ogden Mem-
orandum in their decision to consume or distribute medical marijuana? While
to mean that "we're all in the clear; it's time to expand our businesses and bring in
outside investors").
io. See id.
11. Letter from Michael A. Barlow, Del. Solicitor Gen., to Charles M. Oberly III, U.S.
Attorney for the Dist. of Del. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/
sourcefiles/charles-oberly-delaware-medical-marijuana.pdf.
12. City of Oakland's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, City of Oak-
land v. Holder, 9O1 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. V 12-5245 EJ).
13. Id. at 7.
14. Grim & Reilly, supra note 9.
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this question has received glib treatment in the literature, there is a need for a
stronger treatment of the question of whether this memorandum can generate
an entrapment by estoppel defense.'"
This Comment argues that while the Ogden Memorandum did have a sig-
nificant impact on public perception of the legality of medical marijuana, it
does not create a viable entrapment by estoppel defense. In Part I, the Com-
ment provides an overview on the creation of the entrapment by estoppel de-
fense doctrine dating back to the Supreme Court's decision in Raley v. Ohio. In
Part II, the Comment argues that an entrapment by estoppel defense requires a
specific assurance from a government agent to an individual that action is legal
and is not triggered by an individual's interpretation of a general government
statement. In Part III, the Comment argues that the Ogden Memorandum did
not create an entrapment by estoppel defense and that granting such a defense
would limit the ability of DOJ to offer guidance on how federal prosecutors
ought to invoke their discretion.
I. ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
A defendant who argues entrapment by estoppel seeks to demonstrate that
the government assured him of the legality of his conduct. In United States v.
Batterjee, for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a defense of entrap-
ment by estoppel requires the defendant to prove that "(1) an authorized gov-
ernment official, empowered to render the claimed erroneous advice, (2) who
has been made aware of all the relevant historical facts, (3) affirmatively told
him the proscribed conduct was permissible, (4) that he relied on the false in-
formation, and (5) that his reliance was reasonable."16
The Supreme Court has allowed a defense of entrapment by estoppel in
cases where a defendant was given direct government assurance that his con-
duct was legal, that the defendant relied on that advice and the reliance was rea-
sonable. The Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of entrapment by es-
toppel in Raley v. Ohio.17 There, the defendants had been questioned by Ohio's
Un-American Activities Commission and had received guidance from its
Chairman that they could refuse to answer potentially self-incriminating ques-
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 633, 640 (2011) ("The
NEP does not create a legal defense to a CSA violation. No defendant could cite
the policy as the basis for dismissing a criminal prosecution brought by the Unit-
ed States."). There is a need for a more in-depth consideration of this question in
the literature when faced with a memorandum that was ambiguous and which
was widely interpreted by the public as a form of legalization of medical marijua-
na in accordance with the law of the state in which the marijuana was grown, sold,
and consumed.
16. United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (9 th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
17. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
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tions.'8 However, the Chairman's advice was incorrect and the defendants were
prosecuted and convicted for their refusal to answer. The Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, concluding that affirming the convictions and endorsing the gov-
ernment's conduct "would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrap-
ment."' 9 In Raley, entrapment by estoppel was present because the government
agent gave reasonable advice on which reliance could be placed, and that advice
was given directly to the defendants to guide their behavior.
In Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court affirmed an entrapment by estop-
pel defense, overturning the conviction of demonstrators convicted of protest-
ing excessively close to a courthouse.2" The demonstrators had consulted with
"the highest police officials of the city" and complied with the police instruc-
tions on where they could protest." They were then arrested for protesting too
close to the courthouse.2 The Supreme Court, citing Raley, held that individu-
als cannot be convicted for violating a law when a government official has given
them a direct and reasonable assurance of the legality of their conduct. 3
In Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corporation v. United States, the Penn-
sylvania Industrial Chemical Corporation (PICCO) had been dumping an allot-
ted amount of chemicals into the Monongahela River based on estimates pro-
vided directly to PICCO by the Army Corps of Engineers. 4 Those estimates
were incorrect and PICCO was fined for dumping more than their legally allot-
ted amount of chemicals into the river.2 The Supreme Court held that PICCO
was not liable because the company had a right to rely upon the guidance from
the Army Corps of Engineers and, therefore, "traditional notions of fairness in-
herent in our system of criminal justice prevent the Government from proceed-
ing with the prosecution."26 The Supreme Court focused on the fact that the
Army Corps of Engineers directly assured the company that its actions were le-
gal and that the company relied on that guidance. 7 Raley, Cox, and Pennsylva-
nia Industrial all hold that entrapment by estoppel can apply where a govern-
ment official has provided direct assurance to an individual or company that
their actions are lawful and that assurance guides their subsequent behavior.
18. Id. at 424.
19. Id. at 438.
20. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-69, 571 (1965).
21. Id. at 568-71.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 571.
24. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 671-74 (1973).
25. Id. at 66o.
26. Id. at 674.
27. Id. at 673-74.
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Federal circuit courts, too, have only used entrapment by estoppel as a de-
fense when a government official made a direct commitment to a defendant
that their conduct was lawful. For example, in United States v. Batterjee and
United States v. Talmadge,29 the Ninth Circuit upheld a defense of entrapment
by estoppel where the government issued gun licenses to non-citizens who were
later prosecuted for illegal possession of those weapons. Similarly, in United
States. v. Abcasis, the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of an informant
who dealt heroine based on the suggestion of a police officer.3' Direct assurance
from a police officer to an individual that his conduct was sanctioned by the law
will give that individual the "mistaken but reasonable, good faith belief that he
has in fact been authorized to do so as an aid to law enforcement" and, thus,
provide the grounds for a defense of entrapment by estoppel.3' In United States
v. Hedges, the Eleventh Circuit utilized an entrapment by estoppel defense to
overturn the conviction of an Air Force officer who had been advised by a gov-
ernment attorney that he was not in violation of a conflict of interest statute.32
That legal advice was incorrect but the court held that because the officer "acted
on advice that he was not violating the statute," he could not be held liable for
his violation of the law.33
It. THE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT IN ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL
Courts have not extended the entrapment by estoppel defense to defend-
ants who never directly communicated with government officials but merely
interpreted public statements. In United States v. Carlson, the District of Minne-
sota held that government statements "to the public" cannot "demonstrate an
essential element of entrapment by estoppel: that statements were made to him
rather than in a general sense to the public at large."3 4 Similarly, in United States
v. Lichtenstein35 and United States v. Clark,6 the Fifth Circuit interpreted Raley
28. United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In contrast, 'en-
trapment by estoppel rests on a due process theory which focuses on the conduct
of the government officials rather than on a defendant's state of mind.' While one
of the elements of an entrapment claim is 'the absence of predisposition on the
part of the defendant,' a defendant's predisposition to commit an offense is not at
issue in an entrapment by estoppel defense.") (citations omitted).
29. United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1987).
30. United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).
31. Id. at 43.
32. United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397 (ith Cir. 199o).
33. Id. at 1405.
34. United States v. Carlson, No. 12-305, 2013 WL 5125434, at *31 (D. Minn. Sept. 12,
2013).
35. United States v. Lichtenstein, 61o F.2d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 198o).
36. United States v. Clark, 546 F.2d 1130, 1135 (sth Cir. 197).
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to require specific assurance directly to a defendant that her conduct was legal.
In United States v. Eaton, the Eleventh Circuit held that, "[flor a statement to
trigger an entrapment-by-estoppel defense, it must be made directly to the de-
fendant, not to others."3 7 In contrast to the direct and personal assurances in
Raley, Cox, and Pennsylvania Industrial, public statements cannot protect an in-
dividual from prosecution for illegal conduct.
The courts refused to recognize the DOJ's Petite Memorandum as creating
a legal defense of entrapment by estoppel. The Petite Memorandum offered
guidelines limiting when the DOJ would prosecute crimes that had already been
tried in state court." In United States v. Mclnnis, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
"We have repeatedly refused to enforce that policy by dismissing an indictment;
the practice of avoiding dual prosecution sets only an internal guideline for the
Justice Department."39 Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that "since it is an internal guideline for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, [the Petite Memorandum] does not create a substantive right for the
defendant which he may enforce, and is not subject to judicial review." 40 The
Second Circuit cautioned in United States v. Ng, that "[t]o hold the policy legal-
ly enforceable would be to invite the Attorney General to scrap it, which would
hardly be in the public interest." 4'
In this line of cases, the requirement is that a governmental actor provide a
direct assurance to an individual as to the legality of their action; a misinterpre-
tation of governmental policy simply is not enough to generate a viable en-
trapment by estoppel defense.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE OGDEN MEMORANDUM
Despite representing Department of Justice policy, the Ogden Memoran-
dum was not a direct assurance that medical marijuana was legal under federal
law. The memorandum was widely interpreted by the public as an assurance
that activities permitted under state law would not be prosecuted, but that did
not provide for adequate grounds for an entrapment by estoppel defense.
Thus far, the federal courts have only begun to consider this question. In
United States v. Stacy, the District Court of Southern California held that the
37. United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (iith Cir. 1999).
38. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual 9-2.031 (2013) (the policy "precludes the initiation or
continuation of a federal prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecu-
tion based on substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) unless" there is a
"federal interest" in bringing the case.).
39. United States v. Mclnnis, 6Oi F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States
v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1003, n.19 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the court "need say
only that the Petite policy, an internal policy of the Justice Department, is not to
be enforced against the government").
40. United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1985).
41. United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Ogden Memorandum "was a loose statement that left open the possibility the
Justice Department could change its 'plans' or could choose to prosecute medi-
cal marijuana dispensaries on a case-by-case basis." 42 In Stacy, the court held
that "[e]ven if Defendant's prosecution were contrary to the guidance set forth
in the Memorandum" there are no grounds "for dismissing an indictment be-
cause it is contrary to internal Department of Justice guidelines." 43 Building on
Stacy, the Eastern District of Michigan ruled in United States v. Hicks that the
Ogden Memorandum could not support an entrapment by estoppel defense.
44
In conclusion, the Ogden Memorandum did not legalize marijuana, nor
did it provide any direct guarantee to any individual or company about the le-
gality of their action. Though some members of the public interpreted the
memorandum as legalizing the use and distribution of medical marijuana in
states where this was legal, that was a misinterpretation of the law. The Supreme
Court in Raley, Cox, and Pennsylvania Industrial required a direct assurance
from the government for a defendant to be able to utilize an entrapment by es-
toppel defense. The lower courts overturned convictions based on an entrap-
ment by estoppel defense in circumstances where the government directly as-
sured an individual that their conduct was legal, but the courts have upheld
convictions when an individual relied on a general government statement. The
Ogden Memorandum was not a direct assurance to any individual that their
conduct was legal and, as such, cannot serve as the basis for an entrapment by
estoppel defense. Other district courts should follow the persuasive reasoning in
Stacy and Hicks and reject an entrapment by estoppel defense relying on the
Ogden Memorandum.
At a policy level, there is reason to be concerned that were courts to recog-
nize an entrapment by estoppel defense based on the Ogden Memorandum, the
Department of Justice would likely rescind the memorandum and refrain from
issuing further statements of prosecutorial discretion. As the Second Circuit
noted in United States v. Ng concerning an earlier statement of prosecutorial
discretion, a decision to enforce the policy would be tantamount to "invit[ing]
the Attorney General to scrap it, which would hardly be in the public interest."
45
What is needed from the government, which has been insufficiently ad-
dressed, is a broader public campaign to clarify that such memoranda do not
constitute permission to engage in otherwise illegal activity. There was broad
42. United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
43. Id. at 1149.
44. United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. Mich. 201) ("The Depart-
ment of Justice's discretionary decision to direct its resources elsewhere does not
mean that the federal government now lacks the power to prosecute those who
possess marijuana. Furthermore, Attorney General Holder's and Deputy Attorney
General Ogden's statements cannot be construed as affirmatively representing to
Defendant that he is now authorized to possess or use marijuana under federal
law.") (citations omitted).
45. Ng, 699 F.2d at 71.
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public acclaim for the Ogden Memorandum as some form of legalization of
Marijuana based on the policies of the states. Part of the problem was with the
text of the memorandum itself, which was "pocked with ambiguities that
turned out to be traps for the unwary." 46 More broadly, the administration
knew that there were political advantages in taking a position that would be
seen as helping to usher along the process of medical marijuana legalization. 47
Conservatives generally favored the administration's policy and polls demon-
strated that there was "widespread public support for making marijuana availa-
ble to relieve the suffering of people who are very ill."' President Obama raised
hopes that he would push forward medical marijuana legalization and the ad-
ministration benefited politically from the Ogden Memorandum. In turn, the
administration did little to quash the public recognition of the memorandum as
a form of quasi-legalization. While not legally obligated to emphasize the un-
derlying legal irrelevance of the memorandum, the Department of Justice could
have helped the public have a more realistic understanding of the meaning of
the new policy. In the future, when the Department of Justice establishes guide-
lines concerning prosecutorial discretion, a stronger communications strategy
would help to establish that the policy does not confer any immunity or new
legal rights for potential law-breakers.
Fundamentally, there is a strong public interest in the Department of Jus-
tice being able and willing to lay out memoranda that can help direct resources
towards the prosecution of certain crimes and away from others. That ability
rests on the assumption that such prosecutorial discretion frameworks offer
guidance to prosecutors, but do not give rise to legally enforceable defenses. To
ensure that the Department of Justice can continue to lay out important
frameworks that steer prosecutors towards the most severe crimes, it is im-
portant that courts respect that these frameworks do not give rise to an entrap-
ment by estoppel defense.
46. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How To Avoid a
Federal-State Train Wreck, 19 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION GOVERNANCE STUDIES 1, 1
(Apr. 11, 2013).
47. David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won't Prosecute in States That Allow Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/1o/2o/us/
2ocannabis.html.
48. Id.
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